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FURTHER EVIDENCE OF DISCRIMINATION 
IN NEW CAR NEGOTIATIONS AND 
ESTIMATES OF ITS CAUSE 
Ian Ayres* 
INTRODUCTION 
A 1991 test of new car dealerships in Chicago indicated that 
dealerships offered significantly lower prices to white male testers 
than to similarly situated black and-or female testers: white female 
testers were asked to pay 40% hig~er markups than white male 
testers; black male testers were asked to pay more than twice the 
markup of white male testers; and black female testers were asked 
to pay more than three times the markup of white male testers.1 
This article extends the results of this initial test by presenting not 
only more authoritative evidence of discrimination but also a new 
quantitative method of identifying the causes of discrimination. 
Although the results of the original study were based on 165 
negotiations, the original article emphasized that: 
[t]he most significant methodological weakness concerns the number 
of testers per tester type . . . . Only six testers were hired: one white 
female, one black female, one black male, and three white males. 
Thus, for example, the results demonstrating discrimination against 
black females are based on tests conducted by an individual black fe-
male (paired with one of three white males).2 
This article presents the results of an expanded audit study that cor-
rects for this weakness. In the expanded audits, 38 testers, includ-
ing 5 black males, 7 black females, and 8 white females, negotiated 
for over 400 automobiles. The results are more authoritative than 
the prior test because there is a larger sample size and more testers 
in each race-gender category, and because the tests were conducted 
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Law School, the American Law and Economics As5ociation annual meetings and the Stan-
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1. Ian Ayres, Fair Driving: Gender and Race Discrimination in Retail Car Negotiations, 
104 HARv. L. REv. 817, 819 (1991). 
2. Id. at 826. 
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with enhanced controls to ensure further that testers were similar 
except for their race and gender. 
The results of the expanded audit confirm the previous finding 
that dealers systematically offer lower prices to white males than to 
other tester types. But the more comprehensive data reveal a dif-
ferent ordering of discrimination than in the prior study: as in the 
original study, dealers offered all black testers significantly higher 
prices than white males, but unlike the original study, the black 
male testers were charged higher prices than the black female test-
ers.3 This article examines whether this different gender ordering 
of discrimination for black testers provides insights about the 
causes of discrimination4 or whether it suggests weaknesses in the 
audit design.s 
This article also uses a game-theoretic analysis of sellers' negoti-
ation strategy to infer the causes of the sellers' demonstrated race 
and gender discrimination. At first blush, it seems difficult to use 
evidence of higher offers to distinguish between different possible 
causes of discrimination: for example, because either animus or sta-
tistical inference might cause a dealer to make a higher offer, it 
would seem impossible to infer from a higher offer whether the 
dealer was motivated by hatred or profits. This reasoning holds 
true if the dealer only makes a single offer to each buyer. It is pos-
sible, however, to infer more about the causes of discrimination 
when the dealer makes multiple offers. The dealer's choice of an 
initial offer, the size of concessions, and the speed of concessions 
will vary if the discrimination has different causes. For example, 
sellers might offer a higher initial price to black customers either if 
they believe that the black consumers are averse to bargaining or if 
the sellers have a particular desire to disadvantage black consum-
ers. 6 But game theory suggests that these two causes of discrimina-
tion will give rise to different concession rates: in particular, a 
desire to disadvantage blacks would cause sellers to hold out longer 
for a high price, implying a lower concession rate than if sellers of-
fer high initial prices because they believe black consumers are 
3. See infra notes 27-29 and accompanying text. White females continued to receive of-
fers that were higher than the offers to white males, but lower than the offers to black males 
or females. 
4. For example, the earlier finding that testers received the highest offers from sales-
people of the same race and gender was not replicated in the subsequent study. See infra 
notes 27-29 and accompanying text. 
5. Richard Epstein has recently suggested this possibility. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBID· 
DEN GROUND 51-54 {1993). 
6. We refer to these two motivations respectively as "cost-based statistical discrimina-
tion" and "consequential animus." See infra notes 61-65 and accompanying text. 
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averse to bargaining.7 Our evidence of the dealers' initial offers 
and willingness to make concessions can thus be used to distinguish 
among different causal theories. 
Game-theoretic analysis of bargaining predicts that a seller's 
strategy will be a function of the seller's beliefs about certain vari-
ables, including the buyer's reservation price8 and the buyer's and 
seller's costs of bargaining. Although these variables in theory de-
termine the buyer's and seller's negotiation strategies,9 to date no 
one has estimated the actual effect of these variables in real world 
negotiations.10 This article provides a first attempt at deriving nu-
merical estimates of these structural parameters.11 Evidence about 
the sellers' initial offers, final offers, and the lengths of the negotia-
tion is used to estimate crudely the sellers' beliefs about buyers' 
reservation prices, the buyers' costs of bargaining, and the sellers' 
costs of bargaining. 
This process is repeated to estimate the sellers' beliefs with re-
gard to each race-gender tester type. The article uses the evidence 
about sellers' beliefs to distinguish among four different causal the-
ories of discrimination: 
(1) Sellers may have higher costs per period negotiating with certain 
buyer types - "associational animus"; 
(2) Sellers may desire to disadvantage certain buyer types - "conse-
quential animus"; 
(3) Certain buyer types may have higher per-period negotiating costs 
- "cost-based statistical discrimination";12 and 
( 4) Certain buyer types may have higher reservation prices -
"revenue-based statistical discrimination." 
7. See infra notes 61-62, 82 and accompanying text. 
8. A buyer's reservation price is his or her willingness to pay. Dealers attempting to 
extract the maximum amount of revenue from each consumer will attempt to assess "the 
consumer's firm-specific reservation price - that is, how much the consumer is willing to pay 
for a car from a particular dealership." Ayres, supra note 1, at 844. Dispute resolution theo-
rists alternatively refer to a reservation price as a person's "BATNA," which stands for "best 
alternative to negotiated agreement." See ROGER FISHER & W1LUAM URY, GETI1NG TO 
YES 104-11 (Business Books 1991) (1981); Jennifer Gerarda Brown & Ian Ayres, Economic 
Rationales for Mediation, 80 VA. L. REv. 323, 331 & nn.26-27 (1994). 
9. See, e.g., Anat R. Admati & Motty Perry, Strategic Delay in Bargaining, 54 R. EcoN. 
Sroo. 345 (1987); Peter C. Cramton, Dynamic Bargaining with Transaction Costs, 37 MGMT. 
Scr. 1221 (1991). 
10. Bargaining experiments have explored how student subjects change their behavior as 
the costs of negotiation delay increase. See, e.g., Elizabeth Hoffman & Mathew Spitzer, The 
Coase Theorem: Some Experimental Tests, 25 J.L. & EcoN. 73 (1982). 
11. Prior efforts to estimate the underlying parameters of game-theoretic models of bar-
gaining have been constrained by the quality of the empirical data. See, e.g., Peter C. 
Cramton & Joseph S. Tracy, Strikes and Holdouts in Wage Bargaining: Theory and Data, 82 
AM. EcoN. REv. 100 (1992). 
12. As discussed infra at note 47, this article uses a slightly different definition of "cost-
based" discriinination than the original article. 
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Estimating the sellers' beliefs about different buyer types can thus 
"nest" these four causal tests of discrimination in a single parame-
terization that lets the sellers' own conduct reveal their motives.13 
The estimates of the buyers' and sellers' cost of bargaining and 
of the buyers' reservation price are based on a number of extreme 
assumptions that are not only literally false but probably fail to cap-
ture important parts of reality. The estimates are at best a heuristic 
exercise to guide us imperfectly toward determining the causes of 
discrimination. But given that virtually no other quantitative evi-
dence about the·causes of discrimination in this or any other market 
exists14 and given the usefulness of estimating the basic determi-
nants of negotiation strategies, these estimates of the sellers' beliefs 
may shed some additional light on a relatively dark comer of the 
civil rights landscape. 
With these important caveats, this parameterization of the bar-
gaining game suggests three primary conclusions: 
• Sellers discriminate against different buyer types for different rea-
sons. Cost-based inferences may explain part of sellers' discrimina-
tion against black females while consequential animus may explain 
part of sellers' discrimination against black males; 
• The sellers' bargaining behavior is inconsistent with associational 
animus but supports - especially regarding black males - conse-
quential animus as a partial cause of the sellers' discrimination; and 
• The sellers' bargaining behavior is broadly consistent with revenue-
based statistical inferences as a partial cause of the sellers' 
discrimination. 
These conclusions are also generally consistent with ancillary evi-
dence about the causes of discrimination. As suggested in the origi-
nal study, revenue-based discrimination explains at least part of 
sellers' behavior.15 The game-theoretic parameterization, with all 
its limitations, however, suggests a less monolithic explanation. 
The first Part describes the design of the expanded audit study 
and reports the evidence of race and gender discrimination. Part II 
then uses the game-theoretic analysis to distinguish potential causes 
of the discrimination. The conclusion steps back from the specific 
evidence of discrimination and its several causes to consider legal 
remedies and suggests that the types of discrimination uncovered in 
these audits could be reduced by encouraging dealers to switch to 
13. A model can "nest" different hypotheses if forms of each hypothesis occur for distinct 
parameter values of the model. 
14. But see John Ymger, Measuring Racial Discrimination with Fair Housing Audits: 
Caught in the Act?, 16 AM. EcoN. REv. 881 (1986). 
15. Ayres, supra note 1, at 843-45, 847-52. 
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no-haggle sales and that enhanced consumer protection laws might 
be successful in nudging the market toward a no-haggle 
equilibrium. 
I. ESTIMATING THE EXTENT OF DISCRIMINATION 
A. Describing the Audit Design 
The auditing method used to produce the data in this study 
largely paralleled the method used in the original study.16 The test-
ers were trained to follow a uniform bargaining script, and then sent 
individually to negotiate the purchase of a new automobile at ran-
domly selected Chicago-area dealerships. 1\vo testers - one of 
whom was a white male - separately visited each dealership. 
Thirty-eight testers bargained for approximately 400 cars compris-
ing 9 car mode1s11 at 242 dealerships.1s 
Dealerships were selected randomly, testers were assigned to 
dealerships randomly, and the choice of which tester in the pair 
would first enter the dealership was made randomly. In most cases, 
the two testers visited the dealership within a few days of each 
other. Great pains were taken to assure that the testers projected a 
standardized appearance.19 The expanded audits also used two ad-
16. For a complete description of the original audit methodology, see Ayres, supra note 1, 
at 822. 
17. The nine models included a range from compacts to standard siZe cars, and included 
both imports and domestic makes. Human-subject review committees, seeking to protect the 
privacy of the dealers as human subjects in these tests, prevented us from disclosing the car 
models. 
18. Because of discarded tests and scheduling difficulties 98 of the 404 observations are 
unpaired negotiations in which only one tester visited a particular dealership. Sample selec-
tion problems are always a concern in such situations. Chow tests on all four of the OLS 
equations reported infra in Table II cannot reject pooling the paired and unpaired observa-
tions, however, so there is little reason to believe that the unpaired audits are systematically 
different from the paired audits. See also Ian Ayres & Peter Siegelman, Race and Gender 
Discrimination in Bargaining for a New Car, 85 AM. EcoN. REv. 304 {1995) {finding similar 
results from analysis of paired data alone). 
The test allowed dealers to systematically steer testers to cars with different options. As 
in the original study, there was no evidence of this behavior: the average cost of the cars 
bargained for did not vary significantly by tester type. 
19. As in the original study, the testers' actual age, education, and attractiveness were 
similar and the testers were trained to project similar class characteristics: 
1. Age: All testers were 24 to 28 years old. 
2. Education: All testers had three or four years of college education. 
3. Dress: All testers dressed similarly during the negotiations. Testers wore casual 
"yuppie" sportswear: the men wore polo or button-down shirts, slacks, and loafers; the 
women wore straight skirts, blouses, minimal make-up, and flats. 
4. Economic Class: Testers volunteered that they could finance the car themselves. 
5. Occupation: If asked by a salesperson, each tester said that he or she was a young 
urban professional {for example, a systems analyst for Fust Chicago Bank). 
6. Address: If asked by the salesperson, each tester gave a fake name and an address 
for an upper-class, Chicago neighborhood (Streeterville). 
7. Attractiveness: Applicants were subjectively ranked for average attractiveness. 
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clitional procedures to insure uniformity among the testers.2° First, 
the testers drove to the dealerships in similar used rental cars of the 
same model and year. Using similar modes of transportation pre-
vented the dealers from making inferences about the kind of car the 
tester drove or the way the tester reached the dealership.21 Second, 
unlike the original audits, the testers were not aware that the re-
search was intended to test for race and gender discrimination.22 
The testers followed a uniform bargaining script designed to 
frame the bargaining in purely distributional terms. The script in-
structed the testers to focus quickly on a particular car23 and to tell 
the dealers that they could provide their own financing for the car. 
At the beginning of the bargaining, testers waited for an offer from 
the dealer or, after five minutes, elicited a dealer offer. Once the 
dealer made an initial offer, the tester waited five minutes and re-
sponded with a counteroffer equal to our estimate of the dealer's 
marginal cost for the car.24 
If the salesperson responded by lowering his or her offer, the 
test continued, with the tester's next counteroffer derived from the 
script in one of two ways. At some dealerships, the pairs of testers 
used a "split-the-difference" strategy - like that used by all of the 
testers in the original study - in which the tester's counteroffer 
split the difference between the dealer's offer and the tester's last 
offer. Thus, if a tester initially counteroffered $10,000 and the sales-
person responded with an offer of $12,000, the tester's next re-
sponse would be $11,000. At other dealerships, the testers used a 
Ayres, supra note 1, at 825. 
20. Initially, some testers were instructed to volunteer that they would be moving to Cali-
fornia in the coming month. This representation, suggested by Mitch Polinsky, sought to 
reduce dealers' inferences about repeat sales, referral sales, or repair service. However, deal-
ers encountering two customers moving to California looking for the same car on the same 
day were more likely to voice a suspicion that the two consumers were not shopping indepen-
dently. Because of the dealer expressions of suspicion, this California representation was 
abandoned and the tests in which this representation was made were discarded. This exam-
ple illustrates a general tension between increased controls and maintaining verisimilitude. 
21. In the original study, all the testers parked their cars out of the dealership's sight and 
approached the dealership on foot. See Ayres, supra note 1, at 824 n.27. Some dealers re-
marked to testers that it was unusual, especially in the suburbs, for customers to walk onto a 
dealership lot. 
22. In the original study, the testers knew the study's purpose, and it is possible that this 
knowledge affected their expectations or behavior. Id. at 824-25 n.27. In the larger study, 
the testers did not even know that another tester would be negotiating at each of the dealer-
ships. The testers were told only that the research was investigating how dealers negotiate. 
23. If they were shown more than one car of the type they were bargaining for, the testers 
were instructed to choose the car with the lowest sticker price. 
24. Estimates of dealer cost were taken from Consumer Reports Auto Price Service and 
Edmund's 1989 New Car Prices. As we discuss infra at note 47, making an initial offer at the 
dealer's cost reveals to the dealer that the tester is a fairly sophisticated buyer. 
October 1995] Discrimination in New Car Negotiations 115 
"fixed-concession" strategy in which the testers' counteroffers were 
independent of the sellers' behavior. Testers began, as before, by 
making their first counteroffer at marginal cost. Regardless of how 
much the seller conceded, each of the tester's subsequent counter-
offers increased her previous offer by 20% of the gross markup.25 
Under either bargaining strategy, the tester continued to alter-
nate offers with the dealer until the dealer either (1) attempted to 
accept a tester's offer,26 or (2) refused to bargain further. During 
the course of negotiations, testers jotted down each offer and 
counteroffer as well as options on the car and its sticker price. Af-
ter leaving the dealership, each tester completed a survey describ-
ing the offers and counteroffers as well as ancillary details of the 
test - including, for example, the kinds of questions the dealers 
asked and the race and gender of the salesperson with whom they 
negotiated. 
B. Tests of Discrimination 
Table I reports regressions testing whether dealers treated test-
ers differently. Because the testers were trained to follow an identi-
cal bargaining script, any statistically significant difference in the 
offers made to distinct race-gender types can be ascribed to dispa-
rate treatment by the dealers. In particular, the regressions - after 
controlling for the effects of several variables that varied across the 
audits27 - test whether the dealers' initial and final offers were 
higher to black and-or female testers than to white male testers. 
25. That is, if the car had a sticker price of SP and the tester's last offer was LO, then the 
tester's next offer would be LO + 0.2 x (SP - LO). Because the gross margin (SP - LO) 
decreases as the bargaining continues, the fixed-concession strategy produced smaller conces-
sions in each subsequent round. 
26. The testers did not purchase cars. If a salesperson attempted to accept a tester offer, 
the tester would end the test, saying "Thanks, but I need to think about this before I make up 
my mind." As a legal matter, no contracts were formed both because the testers were care-
fully trained not to sign any documents and thus were protected by the Statute of Frauds and 
because the testers' counteroffers merely invited the dealers to make additional offers -
"Would you sell me this car today for $ ... ?" Ayres, supra note 1, at 824 n.25. 
27. Besides three tester race and gender dummy variables WHITE FEMALE, BLACK 
MALE, and BLACK FEMALE - the regression attempted to discover what aspects of the 
bargaining caused dealers to demand a particular level of profit in their initial and final of-
fers. In particular, the regression focused on the relationship between the profits the dealers 
would have made on their offers and the following variables: 
SPLIT = 1, if tester used split-~e-difference negotiating strategy, 
0, if fixed-concession strategy. 
MODEL; = dummy variables for each different model type 
DAYk = dummy variables for each day of the week 
WEEK1 = dummy variables for each week of the month 
TIME = number of days since start of testing 
EXPERIENCE = number of prior tests by this tester 
FIRST = 1, if tester was the first in the pair to visit dealership, 
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Table I shows that of all the tester types black males clearly 
fared the worst, paying an extra $962 over white males on initial 
offers and $1132 on final offers, after controlling for exogenous 
variables. These coefficients are highly statistically significant - 6 
to 9 times their standard errors. Dealers' initial and final offers to 
black females were roughly $470 and $446, about 4%, higher than 
to white males. These coefficients are again highly significant in all 
the regressions. The disparate treatment of white females, in com-
parison, is less pronounced and statistically less significant. Deal-
ers' initial and final offers to white females were roughly $200 more 
than to white males, about a 2 % additional markup - a difference, 
however, that is not statistically significant at the 5 percent level. 
The current study confirms the original study's :findings that of-
fers to black males and black females are significantly higher than 
those made to white males. The ordering of discrimination, how-
ever, changed: while in the initial study the final offers to black 
females were $500 higher than the final offers to black males,2s in 
the current study, as seen in Table I, black males received offers 
that were $686 higher than those black females received. This 
changed ordering of discrimination suggests that individual charac-
0, otherwise 
UNPAIRED = 0 if test was part of a paired audit, 
1 if test was an unpaired observation. 
The regression equation took the following fonn: 
OFFER = CONSTANT+ :E1(31 (TESTER RACE/GENDER TYPE1) + :EjY'1MODEL1 + 
:E.J;kDAYk + :E1111WEEK1 + 0TIME + uSPLIT + 'J..EXPERIENCE + µFIRST + 
vUNPAIRED + s 
where epsilon is an error tenn that is assumed to be independent and identically distributed. 
Although a thorough review of econometric theory is beyond the scope of this article, a 
few concepts may be of use to the reader. The ordinary least square regression technique 
estimates the CONSTANT and the greek-letter coefficients, (3, 't", and so on in the regression 
equation - except for the error tenn. A "dummy variable" resembles an on-off switch -
assuming values of 0 or 1. By assigning dummy variables to all but one category, we can 
compare differences between any two categories. Thus for the group of four mutually exclu-
sive and exhaustive tester race-gender types, we assign a dummy variable to three of these 
four categories, and the regression provides us with the estimated coefficients for each varia-
ble; white men form the benchmark omitted category. The estimated dummy coefficients 
represent the amount by which membership in the associated category increases or decreases 
the dependent variable as compared to the benchmark category. See Ian Ayres & Joel Wald-
fogel, A Market Test for Race Discrimination in Bail Setting, 46 ST AN. L. REv. 987, 1009 n.84 
{1994). For example in Table I, the $962 coefficient associated with the BLACK MALE 
dummy variable suggests that the dealer profit on initial offers made to black male testers 
was $962 higher than the profit on initial offers made to white male testers - the omitted 
benchmark category. 
28. The average dealer profits for final offers made to different classes of testers were: 
White Male $362 
White Female $504 
Black Male $783 
Black Female $1,283 
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teristics of testers may have biased the results of the initial study.29 
Therefore, in the current study, we tested for the presence of indi-
vidual tester effects by using what econometricians call a ":fixed-
effects" regression specification.30 Using this more sophisticated 
specification,31 we found no evidence that any individual testers en-
countered idiosyncratic treatment - that is, treatment that differed 
from the treatment of other testers of the same race and gender. 
Even after controlling for potential individual effects, we found 
race and gender effects of the same size and statistical significance 
as in Table J.32 
The regressions in Table I also tested the success of several pro-
cedural controls: for example, we expected the coefficients on the 
TESTER EXPERIENCE, FIRST, and UNPAIRED variables not 
to be statistically different from zero.33 The table shows that none 
of these coefficients were significant at the traditional 5 percent 
level and that additional tester experience added a trivial amount 
- $3.41 - to the dealer's final offer. But the size of the FIRST 
coefficient in the final profit regression is troubling even though not 
statistically significant: it suggests that a dealer's final offer to the 
first tester in a pair was $138 higher than to the second tester. This 
result might mean that some dealers realized a test was being con-
ducted and artificially lowered the offer to the second testers.34 
29. Because there was only one black male tester and only one black female tester in the 
original study, any systematic deviations by these testers from the script could have biased 
the test results. As noted in the original study: "The black male tester in the initial experi-
ment, for example, was himself a former car salesperson and is currently a law student. It is 
possible that the lower offers he received in the initial experiment were by-products of his 
overly aggressive deviations from the script." Ayres, supra note 1, at 828 n.36. This explana-
tion for the ordering in the earlier study, however, is not completely satisfying. In the current 
larger study the black female testers experienced much less discrimination than the single 
black female in the initial study. For example, the final offer differential with white males 
decreased more than $800. Unlike my expectation for the black male in the initial study, I 
did not have any reason to expect that the black female tester in the initial study would be 
less aggressive than the subsequent black female testers. 
30. See, e.g., WILLIAM E. GRIFFITHS ET AL., LEARNING AND PRACTICING EcoNOMETRICS 
456-57 (1993). 
31. For a discussion of this specification and the explicit results of the regression, see 
Ayres & Siegelman, supra note 18, at 307-10. 
32. See id. at 311-12. 
33. If testers were faithfully following the script, testers who had previously completed 
more tests would not be treated differently. If the testers were successful at concealing the 
auditing, we would not expect the first tester to receive systematically different treatment 
than the second tester bargaining at the same dealership. Finally, if the unpaired audits were 
representative of the larger sample, we would not expect systematically different results from 
these tests. 
34. Manufacturers, rival dealers, and U.S. Census officials at times audit dealerships to 
determine the real cost of purchasing a new car. Telephone Interview with Margerie 
Yonsura, Wordsmith Relations (Sept. 1, 1992). Alternatively, the dealer may have lowered 
its offer after failing to sell to the initial tester. 
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TABLE J: REGRESSIONS EVALUATING EFFECTS OF TESTERS' 
RACE-GENDER TYPE AND CONTROL VARIABLES 
ON DEALERS' INITIAL AND FINAL PROFITS8 
(N=404; t-statistics in parentheses) 
Initial $ Profit Fmal $ Profit 
CONSTANT 724.61* 417.52* 
(7.23) (6.62) 
Tester Race-Gender 
WHITE FEMALE 209.62 215.69 
(1.54) (1.85) 
BLACK MALE 962.32* 1132.59* 
(6.75) (9.28) 
BLACK FEMALE 470.05* 446.30* 
(3.90) (4.32) 
Control Variables 
SPLITb 
-240.19 -262.59 
(-1.55) (-1.97) 
TESTER EXPERIENCE0 4.76 3.41 
(0.66) (0.55) 
FIRST'1 88.23 138.48 
(0.91) (1.67) 
UNPAIRED" -100.62 -161.02 
(-1.00) (1.87) 
Summary Statistics 
ADJ-R2 0.27 0.33 
SSRx10"3 263758 193706 
* Significantly different from zero at the S percent level. 
• Other variables were included in the regression but are not shown to save space: model 
dummies, TIME (number of days since start of testing), day-of-week dummies, and week-of-
month dummies. None of the coefficients on these unreported temporal variables were large 
or statistically significant 
b 1 if tester used split-the-difference negotiating strategy, 0 if fixed concession. 
c Number of prior tests by this tester. 
d 1 if tester was the first in the pair to visit this dealership, 0 otherwise. 
• 0 if test was part of a paired audit, 1 if test was an unpaired observation. 
We also expected that the tester's use of a split-the-difference 
strategy or a :fixed-concession strategy would not affect the dealer's 
initial offer - for the simple reason that the tester elicited the 
dealer's initial offer before the tester began implementing either 
one of these counteroffer strategies. The SPLIT coefficient was un-
We were also concerned that the dealers' final offers on the unpaired bargaining sessions 
were $161 lower than the final offers on bargaining sessions that were paired. This finding 
suggests that the dealership conditions that caused one of the tests to fail may have affected 
the results of the other, now unpaired, tester who was included in the regression sample. To 
control for this possible flaw, we reran the regression using only the paired data and found 
that again the amount and significance of discrimination was not affected. 
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expectedly negative, indicating that dealers' initial offers to testers 
using the split the difference strategy were $240 less than the initial 
offers to testers using a :fixed-concession strategy - but again this 
difference was not statistically significant. 
The data also confirm that the initial study's finding that dis-
crimination was not merely an artifact of the split-the-difference ne-
gotiation strategy that was used exclusively in the initial study.35 
The dealers continued to discriminate even when the testers 
adopted a :fixed-concession strategy.36 Table I in fact suggests that 
the split-the-difference strategy might be the more effective strategy 
because it led to dealer offers that were $262 lower than the :fixed-
concession strategy, even though this result was not quite statisti-
cally significant at the 5 percent level.37 
In short, the regressions report strong evidence of disparate ra-
cial treatment.38 By following the audit script, the testers projected 
similar personal characteristics except for their race and gender, 
and all the tests of procedural irregularity were, as expected, statis-
tically insignificant.39 Although, in contrast to the earlier study 
black men were discriminated against more than black women, 
there was a consistent pattern of racial discrimination, with white 
male testers receiving substantially lower offers than either type of 
black tester. Indeed, the initial offer white male testers received 
was lower than the final offer 43.5% of nonwhite males received.40 
Th.at is, without any negotiating at all 43 % of white males obtained 
35. When testers' counteroffers split the difference, discrimination in early rounds may 
force dealers' final offers to be discriminatory as well. For example, if the dealer's second 
offer to a black male includes a $1000 profit while the dealer's offer to a white male includes 
only a $400 profit, then any subsequent bargaining will reflect discrimination because under a 
split-the-difference strategy the black male tester will counter with a price based on a $500 
profit that is higher than the dealer's earlier $400 profit offer to the white male. 
36. Separate regressions found no difference in the amount of discrimination for the 
fixed-concession negotiations. See supra note 25 {describing the fixed-concession strategy). 
37. A 5 percent level of significance would require a t-statistic with an absolute value 
greater than 1.98. As shown in Table I, the coefficient estimate for the SPLIT variable has a 
t-statistic of 1.97 and so is almost significant at the standard 5 percent level. 
38. For an alternative interpretation of these results, see EPSTEIN, supra note 5, at 51-54. 
But see also Ian Ayres, Alternative Grounds: Epstein's Discrimination Analysis in Other Mar-
ket Settings, 31 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 67 {1994) (responding to these criticisms). 
39. However, as discussed in the text the size of some of these insignificant coefficients 
gives us some residual concern about the effect of unpaired testers on final profits, first test-
ers on final profits, and using the split-the difference strategy on initial profits. See supra 
notes 34-35 and accompanying text. 
40. See Ayres & Siegelman, supra note 18, at 313. 
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a better offer than their counterparts achieved after bargaining for 
an average of forty-five minute~.41 
II. ESTIMATING THE CAUSES OF DISCRIMINATION 
The regression results establish the existence of discrimination 
but not its cause. This Part uses a game-theoretic model of bargain-
ing to explore empirically the reasons why dealers chose to treat 
black and-or female consumers differently than white males. It is 
particularly difficult to distinguish among competing causal hypoth-
eses without an explicit model of how bigotry or cupidity might in-
fluence sellers' bargaining behavior. For example, though both 
animus and profit-maximizing statistical theories of discrimination 
might cause dealers to offer black testers higher initial prices, it is 
unclear what either of these theories implies about the size or rate 
of the dealers' concessions when buyers and sellers take time to 
haggle. 
We show that different explanations of discrimination cause the 
dealer's choice of an initial offer, the size of concessions, and the 
speed of concessions, to vary. For example, sellers might offer a 
higher initial ppce to a black customer either if they believe that 
black consumers are averse to bargaining or if the sellers have a 
particular desire to disadvantage black consumers. But game the-
ory suggests that these two causes of discrimination will give rise to 
different concession rates: in particular, a desire to disadvantage 
blacks will cause sellers to hold out longer for a high price, implying 
a lower concession rate than a belief that black consumers are 
averse to bargaining.42 Our evidence of the dealers' initial offers 
and willingness to make concessions can thus be used to distinguish 
among competing causal theories. To empirically identify the deal-
ers' motive for discrimination, therefore, we derive a bargaining 
model that allows us to treat different causes of discrimination as 
special cases of a single bargaining game. For example, in this 
model certain parameter values produce a pure animus-based form 
of discrimination while other parameter values give rise to a pure 
profit-maximizing-based form of discrimination. We then use the 
41. In tests in which white male testers received the lower final offer, the offers averaged 
$897 less than their counterparts'; when nonwhite males received lower final offers, their 
offers beat the white males' offers by only $167. Id. at 312-13. 
42. See infra at notes 61-62, 82 and accompanying text. 
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results of our audits to infer which causal theories best fit the 
data.43 
A. A Model of Animus and Statistical Discrimination 
in Bargaining 
We begin by developing a model of bargaining that will allow us 
to nest competing theories of animus and statistical discriniina-
tion. 44 To reproduce the scripted bargaining procedure used in col-
lecting the data, the buyer and seller in the model make alternating 
offers, beginning with an offer from the seller. The model also con-
forms to the data in that the seller can choose how long to delay 
before making an offer.45 The buyer and seller each incur costs per 
unit of time spent bargaining, equal to cb and C51 and these costs are 
assumed to be common knowledge.46 
The seller's reservation price is assumed to be its marginal cost, 
and this amount is common knowledge.47 For expositional conven-
ience, the seller's reservation price is normalized to zero, which 
means that in looking at our results, the seller's profit equals the 
43. In "audit" tests of disparate treatment, pairs of similarly situated testers typically au-
dit a number of establishments in a market to see if decisionmakers discriminate on the basis 
of race or gender. Systematic audits of race and gender discrimination have been conducted 
in a variety of other markets. See, e.g., MICHAEL FIX & RAYMOND J. STRUYK, CLEAR AND 
CoNVINCING EVIDENCE: MEASURING DISCRIMINATION IN .AMERICA (1993) (housing and 
employment audits); Ymger, supra note 14 (housing audit). 
44. The model is based on a bargaining game designed by Peter Cramton. See Cramton, 
supra note 9. 
45. Cramton's original model also allowed the buyer to choose how long to delay before 
making an offer. Even though testers following the script made their offers five minutes after 
a new dealer offer, the script's timing restriction does not affect the seller's equilibrium strat-
egy because the model predicts that the seller's strategy will be independent of the buyer's 
bargaining strategy. See infra note 54. 
46. The model also assumes a second type of transaction cost in that all traders discount 
future payoffs at a common rate, r. Alternatively, r can be interpreted as the probability, per 
unit of time, that the negotiations will exogenously break down. The importance of r as an 
underlying determinant of the bargaining equilibrium is discussed infra at notes 78-79 and 
accompanying text. 
47. Both of these assumptions are reasonable: a seller's marginal cost is often a good 
proxy for its reservation price, see Ian Ayres & Clayton Miller, "I'll Sell It to You at Cost:" 
Legal Methods to Promote Retail Markup Disclosure, 84 Nw. U. L. R.Ev. 1047 (1990), and the 
testers quickly indicated that the sellers' cost was common knowledge by setting their first 
counteroffer equal to this cost. See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
The model also assumes that the dealer's marginal cost of selling a car is the same for all 
tester race-gender types. This is reasonable because the testers' script was explicitly struc-
tured to eliminate cost-based differences among the testers. For example, the testers volun-
teered that they did not need financing. See Ayres, supra note 1, at 846. The original study 
used the term "cost-based discrimination" to refer to the possibility that dealers would offer 
different prices if they believed there were different costs of selling to specific tester types. 
Here, the term is used to refer to the possibility that dealers would offer different prices if 
they believed that certain tester types had higher per period costs of bargaining. 
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price, and the gains from trade are equal to the buyer's reservation 
price. 
The buyer, however, is assumed to have private information 
about her reservation price, although the distribution of buyers' res-
ervation prices is common knowledge. To solve the model, we as-
sume that the buyers' reservation prices are distributed uniformly 
between 0 and some maximum value, h. 4s 
Dealer Concession Curve 
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 1.1 1.2 
Hours Spent Bargaining 
FIGURE 1: DEALER CONCESSION CURVE 
These assumptions give rise to a "signalling" equilibrium be-
cause the buyer's option to delay allows buyers with low reservation 
prices to signal this fact by their willingness to delay.49 The dealer's 
equilibrium strategy is contingent upon three underlying parame-
ters: the buyer's and seller's per period cost of bargaining and the 
buyer's maximum reservation price - Cs, cb, and h. Given particu-
lar values of these parameters, the Appendix shows that a simple 
concession curve summarizes a seller's equilibrium strategy: for ex-
ample, Figure 1 depicts a concession curve - when Cs = cb = $100/ 
48. The assumption that the distribution of buyers' reservation prices has a lower support 
of 0 is not restrictive. As shown infra note 54, the sellers' optimal bargaining strategy is 
independent of this lower support - so at least in the case of a uniform distribution, rational 
buyers only need to infer the location of the upper support. 
49. Because the gains from trade are discounted - by a common discount rate, r -
buyers with low reservation prices have lower costs of delay and hence can use delay as a 
credible signal. Admati & Perry, supra note 9. Unlike screening models, this model has the 
attractive feature that the equilibrium does not depend critically on a minimum time between 
offers. 
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hour, and h = 3000.50 The concession curve shmys the offer that the 
seller is willing to make at any particular time. A seller's equilib-
rium concession strategy has the following characteristics: 
The seller starts by making the initial offer - depicted at time 0 on 
the concession curve;51 if the buyer makes a counter offer on or above 
the concession curve, the seller accepts;52 if the buyer makes a 
counter offer below the curve, the seller rejects and offers the price on 
the concession curve for the elapsed amount of time.53 
The model predicts that sellers will make a series of decreasing of-
fers, but that at some point rationally will refuse to make any fur-
ther concessions.s4 
If dealers' beliefs about the underlying parameters - cS1 cb, and 
h - are different for specific tester types, the model predicts that 
dealers will use different concession curves when bargaining with 
these different tester types. Thus, if a dealer experiences a higher 
cost of bargaining with a particular type of buyer, or believes that a 
particular type of buyer has a higher willingness to pay, or has 
higher costs of bargaining, the model predicts how these differences 
will affect the dealer's behavior. The details of the model are 
worked out in the Appendix.ss 
The next Part shows how dealers' beliefs about these three vari-
ables correspond to traditional causal theories of. discrimination. 
50. The example also assumes that the discount rate for both parties is .5. See infra notes 
78-79 and accompanying text. 
51. In Figure 1, the seller's initial offer is $1000. 
52. For example in Figure 1, if the buyer offers $800 after one-quarter of an hour, the 
seller would accept. 
53. For example in Figure 1, if the buyer offers $600 after one-quarter of an hour, the 
seller would reject the offer and immediately offer $789. The model's prediction that sellers 
would immediately counter any buyer offer lower than the concession curve was somewhat 
contradicted by tester experience, however, as testers reported that sellers would at times 
delay before making subsequent offers. 
54. As shown in Figure 1, after .6 hours, the seller refuses to make any further conces-
sions below $400. Sellers know that buyers with a reservation price below some critical value 
cannot credibly signal their valuation because the transaction costs of delay are greater than 
the buyer's expected gains from trade. Sellers infer that these low valuers will not find it 
worthwhile to begin bargaining, and sellers consequently choose not to make offers to buyers 
with these low valuations. See infra app. 
The model also predicts that a seller's offers will be independent of the buyer's previous 
counteroffers: for example, in Figure 1 the seller's strategy after one-quarter of an hour is to 
offer to sell for $725 - regardless of whether the buyer's last counteroffer was $150 or $700. 
This prediction of independence finds at least weak support in the data - because as re-
ported earlier, sellers' final offers when testers used a fixed-concession strategy were not 
significantly different from sellers' final offers when testers used a split-the-difference strat-
egy. See supra note 37 and accompanying text. As stressed above, however, the difference in 
the offers was unexpectedly high and almost achieved 5 percent significance. See supra note 
37 and accompanying text. 
55. See infra app. 
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We then use evidence of the dealers' actual concession curves to 
infer which of the causal theories best explains the data. 
B. Causal Theories of Discrimination in Bargaining 
The bargaining model we derived can accommodate four com-
peting explanations as to why dealers would offer higher prices to a 
disfavored group than to white males: 
(1) Sellers may have higher costs of bargaining with a disfavored 
group - "associational animus," reflected in higher values of cs;56 
(2) Sellers may desire to disadvantage a disfavored group - "conse-
quential animus," reflected in lower net values of cs; 
(3) Sellers may believe that a disfavored group has higher costs of 
bargaining - "cost-based" discrimination, reflected in higher values 
of cb; and 
( 4) Sellers may believe that a disfavored group has higher reservation 
prices - "revenue-based" discrimination, reflected in higher h. 
First, consider associational animus. In the employment context, 
Gary Becker showed that if a bigoted employer dislikes spending 
time with members of a particular group, the employer may offer 
members of that group a lower wage to compensate the employer 
for this associational animus.57 In our model a seller's dislike of 
spending time with a particular group, associational animus, can be 
naturally captured by an increase in the seller's costs per period (cs) 
of associating, when negotiating with testers from the disfavored 
group. 
In our bargaining model, "associational animus" yields a star-
tlingly perverse result: black consumers can benefit from the pres-
ence of bigotry. One of the robust58 results of bargaining theory is 
that higher bargaining costs tend to reduce one's bargaining 
power.59 Thus, higher per period costs of negotiating with black 
consumers should lower sellers' bargaining power and induce them 
to make lower offers to black buyers.60 Thus, even before we for-
mally estimate the model, theory suggests that associational animus 
56. This article also examines the possibility that different discount rates might give rise 
to disparate treatment. See infra note 102 and accompanying text. 
57. GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION {2d ed. 1971). 
58. A "robust" result is one that remains unchanged as inconsequential assumptions vary. 
59. See MARTIN J. OSBORNE & ARIEL RUBINSTEIN, A COURSE IN GAME THEORY 117-31 
(1994). 
60. Sufficiently large associational costs could reverse the market power story by causing 
a seller to terminate the negotiations if the buyer does not accept what is in effect a take-it-
or-leave-it initial offer. See Cramton, supra note 9, at 1222-23. However, given that the deal-
ers were willing to spend a substantial amount of time bargaining with all testers, see infra tbl. 
II, and dealers bargained longer with black men then with white men, see infra tbl. II, it is 
unlikely that this extreme form of associational animus could explain our results. 
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against black customers will not be able to explain why, in a bar-
gaining context, dealers offered black testers higher prices. 
The perverse result that seller bigotry might benefit blacks sug-
gests that allowing animus to take only the form of an associational 
tax (a higher cs) does not account for all possible forms of bigotry. 
For example, bigoted sellers might alternatively enjoy extracting a 
high profit more from black or female customers than from white 
males. The Appendix shows that disproportionately valuing profits 
from disfavored groups has the effect of reducing the seller's effec-
tive, per-period cost of bargaining.61 We refer to this type of dis-
criminatory motive as "consequential animus" because the seller 
dislikes the consequence of contracting with disfavored groups on 
equal terms.62 Sellers motivated by consequential animus act as if 
they had lower per period costs of bargaining: they are willing to 
bargain longer for a high price because they attach a higher value to 
extracting profits at the expense of a disfavored group. Unlike as-
sociational animus, consequential animus - by reducing the 
seller's effective costs of bargaining - enhances a seller's bargain-
ing power and is compatible with blacks and-or women receiving 
higher offers than white males. 
The model can also capture two types of "statistical discrimina-
tion" based on sellers' inferences about a group's cost of bargaining 
or its willingness to pay.63 Statistical discrimination is caused not by 
61. For example, a seller's payoff might increase by a. > 1 for each additional dollar se-
cured in negotiations with a disfavored consumer group. This form of consequential animus 
has the effect of lowering the seller's effective cost of bargaining, so that c', = c,la. See infra 
app. 
62. Consequential animus may take many other fonns as well. For example, if sellers 
enjoy seeing blacks and women expend time bargaining, this form of animus would also have 
the effect of decreasing sellers' net costs of bargaining with these groups. At a more subtle 
level, the sellers' motive may not be to disadvantage other groups, but to advantage their 
own group. Richard McAdams has recently explored the possibility that relative group pref-
erences might provide a more compelling explanation of many types of discrimination. 
Richard H. McAdams, Cooperation and Conflict: The Economics of Group Status Produc-
tion and Race Discrimination, 108 HAR.v. L. REv. 1003 (1995); see also John J. Donohue, III, 
Prohibiting Sex Discrimination In the Workplace: An Economic Perspective, 56 U. CHI. L. 
REv. 1337 (1989). Although the bargaining model analyzed in the text begins with individual 
preference as the foundational cause of discrimination, McAdams's work explores the social 
underpinnings of these preferences. 
63. One car salesman turned consumer advocate described the general tendency of deal-
ers to make statistical inferences based on gender: "[S]alesmen ••. categorize people into 
'typical' buyer categories. During my time as a salesman I termed the most common of these 
the 'typically uninformed buyer' •... [In addition to their lack of information, these] buyers 
tended to display other common weaknesses. As a rule they were indecisive, wary, impulsive 
and, as a result, were easy to mislead. Now take a guess as to which gender of the species 
placed at the top of this 'typically easy to mislead' category? You guessed it - women." 
DARRELL PARRISH, THE CAR BuYER's ARr. How TO BEAT THE SALESMAN AT His OWN 
GAME 3 (1989). 
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sellers' animus, but rather by their use of observable variables such 
as race or gender to maximize profits.64 "Cost-based" discrimina-
tion could occur, for example, if a seller believes that a disfavored 
group is on average more averse to bargaining. Bargaining aver-
sion or impatience might cause buyers to act as if they had higher 
bargaining costs. The sellers' statistical inference about a group's 
cost of bargaining might cause profit-maximizing sellers to quote 
higher prices to all members of this group because sellers would 
believe that members of this group on average have less bargaining 
power. The model captures the possibility of "cost based" discrimi-
nation by allowing sellers to form different beliefs about the bar-
gaining costs (cb) of specific tester race-gender types.65 
Finally, we can use the model to examine "revenue based" sta-
tistical inferences founded on perceived differences in the distribu-
tion of reservation prices among consumer groups.66 If sellers 
believe that blacks or women have different distributions of reser-
vation prices than white males - for example, distributions with 
higher means or greater variances, this could lead dealers to offer 
higher prices to members of these groups. 
Profit-maximizing sellers might use race or gender to make inferences not only about the 
expected revenues, but also about the expected costs of selling a car to a particular buyer -
including, for example, the expected costs of default on car loans. The script, however, at-
tempted to eliminate this type of statistical discrimination by having all testers volunteer 
early in the negotiations that they were providing their own financing, so the dealership bore 
no default risk. Even though all testers volunteered that they did not need financing, dealers 
might disparately assess the credibility of this information depending on the gender and race 
of the tester. If statistically valid, this inference could form the basis for cost-based statistical 
discrimination. Profit-maximizing dealers might also make inferences about the profits from 
ancillary sales, so dealers' inferences about the likelihood of repeat purchases, referrals, or 
repair service could also cause statistical discrimination. To dampen the importance of such 
inferences, we initially had testers volunteer to salespeople that they were moving out of the 
state within a month. Having more than one tester make this representation at a single deal-
ership, however, increased the likelihood that dealers would suspect a test, and so we discon-
tinued it See supra n.20. 
64. Edmund S. Phelps, The Statistical Theory of Racism and Sexism, 62 AM. EcoN. RBv. 
659 (1972). 
65. Within the precise confines of the model, the dealers' inferences about tester cost are 
not statistical in the typical sense. The model assumes that the testers' cost of bargaining (cb) 
is commonly known by both the tester and the dealer. Normally, statistical discrimination is 
modeled as a process whereby a decisionrnaker uses gender or some other observable charac-
teristic as a proxy for some unknown characteristic. See Phelps, supra note 64. But a belief 
that blacks have higher bargaining costs based on common knowledge would induce dealers 
to charge blacks higher prices just as a belief based on statistical inference would. 
66. In the real world, statistical discrimination might be based on variables other than 
buyers' reservation prices. For example, unlike this model, buyers' bargaining costs are typi-
cally not known to sellers; sellers could thus use race or gender to make inferences about the 
costs of negotiations for different buyer types. Or, in models with search costs, sellers could 
use race or gender to infer buyers' search costs. In this model, buyers' reservation prices are 
the key variable that is unknown to sellers, and are thus the focus of statistical discrimination. 
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The bargaining model used in the current study formalizes the 
assertion in the original article that revenue-based discrimination 
will often become a "search for suckers": 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that at some dealerships up to fifty per-
cent of the profits can be earned on just ten percent of the sales .... 
From a dealer's perspective, bargaining for cars is a "search for suck-
ers" - a search for consumers who are willing to pay a high 
markup .... 
. . . In their quest to locate high-markup buyers, dealers are not 
guided by the amount that the average black woman is willing to pay. 
Rather, they focus on the proportion of black women who are willing 
to pay close to the sticker price.67 
The model starkly replicates this result because profit-maximizing 
sellers do not care about a group's average willingness to pay; 
rather, revenue-based discrimination turns solely on the seller's be-
lief about the maximum amount any given group member would be 
willing to pay.68 The dealers' exclusive interest in estimating the 
"upper tail,, of the buyer's willingness-to-pay distribution is an arti-
fact of the uniform distribution assumption. However, the intuition 
that dealers' behavior will be more attuned to their beliefs about 
high-markup buyers rather than the average buyer still holds true 
under less restrictive assumptions.69 Therefore, even if blacks have 
a lower average willingness to pay than whites, profit-maximizing 
sellers might nevertheless make higher offers to blacks - as long as 
a sufficient number of black consumers are willing to pay an espe-
cially high markup. 
This section has shown that the traditional game-theoretic de-
terminants of bargaining behavior - that is, the buyer's and seller's 
costs of bargaining and inferences about the buyer's willingness to 
pay - can capture four different explanations of discrimination. 
On theoretical grounds, we have been able to reject "associational 
animus" as a plausible explanation for higher prices encountered by 
67. Ayres, supra note 1, at 854-55 (citations omitted). The original article emphasized 
that the term "sucker" should not be taken to imply that high-markup buyers are irrational 
or uninformed because high search costs or a high aversion to bargain could make it rational 
to pay a high markup. Id. at 854 n.109. 
68. Notice that the lower bound of the support of buyers' reservation prices, /, does not 
appear in the seller's first order condition, equation (3). More generally, the seller's strategy 
does not depend on I; unless /i is so high that the seller finds it optimal to make an initial offer 
that is acceptable to all type i buyers. See Cramton, supra note 9. This did not occur in our 
data. 
69. Even under general assumptions about distributions, a linear mean-preserving spread 
of buyers' reservation prices will shift a seller's offers upward for any given period of delay. 
Cramton & Tracy, supra note 11. 
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minority and-or female testers. The next section empirically evalu-
ates the remaining three hypotheses. 
Although the next section's estimates of the model's parameter 
values are an important first step in quantifying evidence of the 
causes of discrimination, our simple bargaining model cannot cap-
ture a number of powerful and more foundational explanations for 
discrimination. For example, the model cannot distinguish between 
rational statistical inference and irrational stereotyping, or identify 
the cause of the irrationality.70 As stressed in the original article: 
"it may prove impossible to parse out the various elements of ani-
mus and rational inferences from irrational stereotypes. No single 
causal theory may be adequate to explain discrimination against 
both blacks and women."71 With these caveats, the next section ex-
plores whether car dealers' disparate racial and gender treatment of 
consumers flows .from different causes. 
C. Estimating the Parameters of the Model 
This section uses data on the sellers' actual concessions to esti-
mate which seller beliefs would give rise to the measured bargain-
ing behavior. We have shown how in theory the model predicts 
that three underlying parameters (Cs. cb, and h) will determine how 
sellers bargain. Now we work backward, using evidence of how 
sellers bargained with particular tester types to infer the underlying 
parameters that would be consistent with the sellers' bargaining 
behavior. 
In particular, we calculated three measures of seller behavior 
when bargaining with each of the four tester types: the sellers' av-
erage initial offer (p1), the sellers' average final offer (pp), and aver-
age time spent bargaining (b..p).72 These averages, shown in section 
A of Table II give crude information about the shape of sellers' 
concessions curves when bargaining with different tester types. 
70. The model can similarly capture whether dealers bargain as if they disproportionately 
enjoy disadvantaging minority buyers, but estimates of the sellers' bargaining cost cannot 
begin to tell us why sellers have such preferences. In part, this is because the model proceeds 
from an atomistic conception of dealers and dealer behavior: social influences on prefer-
ences are taken as exogenous. See McAdams, supra note 62; Anthony D. Taibi, Banking, 
Finance, and Community Economic Empowerment: Structural Economic Theory, Procedural 
Civil Rights, and Substantive Racial Justice, 107 HARv. L. REV. 1463 {1994) (criticizing incom· 
pleteness of economic theories of discrimination). 
71. Ayres, supra note 1, at 852. 
72. The average final offer and the time spent bargaining were calculated using only those 
test sessions that ended with the seller's refusal to bargain further because in tests ending 
with attempted acceptances, the seller's attempted acceptance might have occurred at a point 
above the concession function. Moreover, the fact that negotiations ended with sellers refus· 
ing to bargain further allows us to identify buyer costs from equation (4), infra app. 
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We can use these three observations about a seller's concession 
curve to estimate the seller's beliefs about the three parameters of 
interest: the sellers' and buyers' bargaining costs (cs and cb) and the 
upper bound of buyers' reservation prices (h ).73 This inferential 
process would be an interesting exercise in empirical game-theory if 
it were done once simply to evaluate the general determinants of 
seller behavior. But as we have shown, by repeating the process 
with regard to each buyer race-gender type, we can also evaluate 
alternative causal theories of discrimination. Our estimates of Cs. cb, 
and h are shown in part B of Table II and Figures 2-4 for each of 
the different buyer groups. 
The estimates in Table II stand on a much weaker statistical 
footing than the estimates in Table I. The estimation method is ex-
tremely crude: in theory, all of the points on the sellers' concession 
curve could be used to identify the sellers' beliefs, but the estima-
tion in Table II uses only three pieces of information about the 
curve, and even those are only averages. However, because the 
model makes strong predictions about seller behavior, these three 
observations - for each tester type - are sufficient to make crude 
inferences about three seller beliefs. In econometric terms, how-
ever, there are no additional degrees of freedom - so it is impossi-
ble to assess whether our estimates are statistically significant. 
These results should also be interpreted very cautiously because 
three of the model's assumptions are suspiciously artificial. First, 
the model makes extremely strong assumptions about the buyer's 
and seller's knowledge: namely, that the buyer's and seller's per 
period bargaining cost (cb and cs). the discount rate (r), the seller's 
73. The inferential process is straightforward because tbe underlying parameters (c., cb, 
and h) can be expressed as algebraic functions of tbe seller's initial and final offer and tbe 
time spent bargaining (p1, pp, and 8p): 
c, = 
r(p1Dp-pp) (3) (1- DF) , 
Cb= 
rD~1-pp) (4) (1-DF) , 
h= 
pI(S + 5DF - D}) - pp(5 + 2Dp - D}) (5) 
3 
where DF = exp[-r8F]· These explicit formulas are derived from Cramton, supra note 9; see 
also infra app. While these expressions seem algebraically formidable, they capture the stra-
tegic intentions of the model. For example, longer bargaining hours (DF) imply lower seller 
costs (c,) because sellers with lower costs would be willing to haggle longer. This is captured 
algebraically in equation (3) because 
(6) 
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TABLE II: PARAMETERIZATION OF THE BARGAINING MODEL 
BY TESTER TYPEa 
A. DATA ON SELLER CONCESSIONS 
Number of Observations 
Average Initial Price, P1 
Average Final Price, PF 
Average Time (in hours) Spent Bargaining, b.F 
White White Black Black 
Males Females Females Males 
198 63 
1076.9 1145.9 
687.8 . 740.0 
0.60 0.77 
81 
1360.8 
951.2 
0.59 
53 
1709.6 
1468.1 
0.66 
B. ESTIMATED VALUE OF UNDERLYING PARAMETERS (holding r constant)b 
Seller's bargaining cost (per hour), Cs 560.5 433.1 578.8 207.2 
Buyer's bargaining cost (per hour), Ct. 592.6 469.5 635.4 331.4 
Buyer type's maximum valuation, h 2868.8 3017.9 3462.4 3792.7 
C. ESTIMATED VALUE OF UNDERLYING PARAMETERS (holding Cs constant)• 
Discount rate (per hour), r 0.63 0.46 0.52 0.17 
Buyer's bargaining cost (per hour), cb 365.5 308.7 437.0 309.8 
Buyer type's maximum valuation, h 2580.0 2750.6 3172.5 3722.3 
• For tests that ended in refusal to bargain only. 
b Calculated by evaluating the function for each individual and averaging the results across 
all individuals. Assumes that the discount rate is 0.1 per hour for all tester types. 
0 Calculated by evaluating the function for each individual and averaging the results across 
all individuals. Assumes that the discount rate is set so that the seller's cost is equal to $100 
per hour for all tester types. 
reservation price ($0) and the distribution of buyer reservation 
prices (uniformly distributed between 0 and h) are all common 
knowledge.74 This assumption would fail, for example, if buyers did 
not know sellers' per period cost of negotiation. Common knowl-
edge assumptions, however, are often used to solve bargaining 
games of this type.1s 
Second, the model's assumption that buyer reservation prices 
are uniformly distributed is highly restrictive. For example, if reser-
vation prices followed a normal - bell-curve - distribution, 
profit-maximizing sellers would need to make more complicated in-
ferences about both the mean and variance of reservation prices.76 
74. This implies not only that the seller and buyer each knows these values, but that each 
knows that the other knows, and each knows that the other knows that the other knows, ad 
infinitum. See John Geanakoplos, Common Knowledge, J. EcoN. PERSP., Fall 1992, at 53. 
75. See, e.g., Cramton, supra note 9. But see Robert H. Gertner & Geoffrey P. Miller, 
Settlement Escrows, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. ff7 (1995) (employing an asymmetric infonnation bar-
gaining model to settlement negotiations). 
76. See supra text accompanying note 69. As a theoretical matter, the sticker prices on 
the cars could limit the maximum amount that dealers could use for their initial offer and add 
another determinant of dealer behavior. But because the average dealer offer was substan-
tially below the average sticker price even for black male testers, sticker prices probably were 
not a binding constraint. 
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Our use of only three pieces of seller information, however, limits 
our ability to identify the parameters of other, more complicated, 
distributions.11 
Third, the model assumes that the buyer and the seller discount 
their future gains from trade at the same rate.78 This assumption is 
suspect because buyers and sellers may have different discount 
rates. Moreover, as we explore below,79 it is possible that the seller 
has different discount rates for particular tester types. Without 
placing some restriction on the relative values of the discount rate, 
however, our information about the seller concession curve cannot 
identify the other underlying parameters. 
Because of the nonstatistical estimation procedure and the 
model's restrictive assumptions, the estimates of the underlying pa-
rameters, contained in Table II and Figures 2-4, cannot be reliably 
interpreted as unbiased estimates of, for example, the seller's actual 
dollar cost of bargaining per hour. The parameter estimates, how-
ever, may provide some evidence to rank ordinally the sellers' be-
liefs about different tester types. Ordinal rankings are still useful in 
assessing the causes of the discrimination because knowing that 
sellers have lower costs of bargaining with black men, for example, 
an ordinal ranking of sellers' bargaining costs can help identify the 
presence of consequential animus. 
Even these ordinal inferences, however, may be fraught with er-
ror. The results should be viewed cautiously as a first heuristic step, 
but along with ancillary data - reported below - they provide 
some insights into why sellers discriminate. 
D. Animus-Based Discrimination 
Figure 2 suggests that sellers have lower per-period costs of ne-
gotiating with black males than with any other tester type. For ex-
ample, Table II shows that at a discount rate of 10% per hour 
sellers act as if their cost is $560 per hour when bargaining with 
white males but only $207 when bargaining with black males. Fig-
ure 2 shows that except when bargaining with black males, the 
seller bargaining costs with other tester types are relatively simi-
77. Three observations about the sellers' concession curve cannot be used to identify four 
underlying parameters: as in trying, for example, to infer both the mean and variance of the 
buyer reservation price distribution as well as the buyer and seller per-period cost. 
78. Part B of Table II assumes a discount rate of 10% per hour while Figures 2-4 shows 
the values of c,, cb, and h for various discount rate values. These discount rates are substan-
tially higher than the pure time value of money, but may be reasonable because they also 
include the risk that the bargaining could end at any time. See supra note 46. 
79. See infra note 102 and accompanying text. 
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lar.so The sellers' bargaining costs with black males are estimated 
to be low because sellers made the smallest concessions to and 
spent the longest time bargaining with black male testers. The 
model predicts that higher bargaining costs would have led sellers 
to make quicker and more substantial concessions.s1 
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FIGURE 2: EsTIMATES OF SELLERS' PER-PERIOD COST (Cs) OF 
NEGOTIATING WI.Tii DIFFERENT TESTER RACE-GENDER 
TYPES FOR VARYING DISCOUNT RATES (r) 
These results are inconsistent with associational animus as the 
cause of discrimination because the sellers are acting as if the cost 
of associating with white males was highest or second highest 
among all tester types. These estimates of Cs are, however, consis-
tent with the theory that "consequential animus" is at least partially 
responsible for the higher prices offered to black males. As dis-
cussed above, disproportionately valuing profits extracted from 
black males would lead dealers to act as if they had lower "net" 
costs of negotiation: sellers would hold out longer and make 
smaller concessions. Indeed, the sellers' slow and small concessions 
to black males are consistent with the hypothesis that sellers en-
80. Sellers act as if their cost of bargaining with white females might also be lower. See 
infra fig. 2. 
81. In our larger sample, salespersons spent nearly 13% longer negotiating with the "mi-
nority" testers than with the white males, which casts doubt on salesperson animus as the 
source of price differences. The average test by a white male lasted 36.2 minutes. The aver-
age for the other testers was 40.8 minutes. A t-test reveals that these differences are statisti-
cally significant at the 0.001 level. 
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joyed extracting dollars from black males twice as much as ex-
tracting dollars from white males.82 
These estimates of seller bargaining cost provide some evidence 
of consequential animus, but without more data they cannot iden-
tify precisely whose animus influences the seller's behavior. Gary 
Becker has shown that a firm's behavior in the marketplace can 
reflect the animus of owners, employees, or consumers.83 To ex-
plore the source of animus - especially the consequential animus 
that would produce higher offers for black males - we estimated 
regressions designed to reveal whether the race of a dealership's 
owner, salesperson, or customers influenced the amount of discrim-
ination. If we assume that black market participants are less likely 
to have animus against other blacks,84 then by comparing the effect 
of, say, the salesperson's race on the amount of discrimination we 
may be able to isolate the source of the animus. The results of 
these regressions are reported in Table III. 
1. Owner Animus 
Table III includes a dummy variable MINOWN for minority-
owned dealerships as well as an interaction dummy equalling one 
when both the tester and the owner were black. None of these had 
coefficients that were significant in any of the regressions, indicat-
ing that the owner's race did not influence the bargaining outcome 
and that black testers did not fare better at black owned 
dealerships. 85 
There is additional evidence against the importance of owner 
animus in explaining discrimination. Bigoted owners should be 
82. As shown in the Appendix, if sellers value black male profits a times more than white 
male profits, they will act as if their cost of bargaining is cbm = Cwmla {where cbm and Cwm are 
the sellers cost of bargaining with black males and white males respectively). The estimates 
for cbm and Cwm in Table II can be used to calculate an estimate for a equalling 2.7 (in other 
words, 560.46/206.16). 
83. BECKER, supra note 57. 
84. For a variety of social reasons, African-Americans may also act as if they harbor 
associational or consequential animus against other African-Americans. See Ayres, supra 
note 1, at 840-41, 847. 
85. We used as sources the "Black Pages," an analogue of the Yellow Pages in which 
firms that are more than 50% black-owned voluntarily list their businesses, supplemented by 
a City of Chicago listing of minority-owned businesses. Listing in either source is voluntary, 
so we may have excluded some black-owned dealerships. We were unable to find any fe-
male-owned dealerships in analogous sources. Because there were only 9 black-owned deal-
erships in our sample - these dealerships might have been able to "free-ride" on the market 
discrimination by charging their black customers a price that reflects the discriminatory pre-
mium at white-owned dealerships. It is also theoretically possible that black owners dislike 
dealing with blacks, but at a minimum this would implicate a nontraditional form of 
discrimination. 
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TABLE III: REGRESSIONS OF lNrrIAL AND FINAL PROFITS AND 
MARKUPS ON CONTROL VARIABLES, RACE AND GENDER 
DUMMIES, AND INTERACTION EFFECTS8 
(N=404; t-statistics in parentheses) 
Initial Final Initial Fm al 
$Profit $Profit %Markup %Markup 
TESTER RACE-GENDER DUMMIES 
White Female 193.78 225.44 1.79 2.02• 
(1.30) (1.76) (1.43) (2.00) 
Black Male 886.18• 889.0l• 6.72• 7.06• 
(3.23) (3.82) (2.93) (3.79} 
Black Female 399.67 169.70 3.06 0.98 
(1.60) (0.79) (1.47) (0.58) 
NEIGHBORHOOD VARIABLES 
Suburb (!=Suburb) -230.04 -221.91 -1.64 -1.51 
(-1.58) (-1.78) (-1.34) (-1.52) 
SuburbxBlack Tester 63.64 263.76 0.95 2.61 
Household lncomex1Cl3 
(0.25) (1.22) (0.45) (1.53) 
4.50 -0.08 0.03 -0.001 
(0.79) (-0.02) (0.60) (-0.02) 
Percent Black in Neighborhood -30.74 117.92 -0.29 0.88 
(-0.12) (0.54) (-0.14) (0.51~ Percent BlackxBlack Tester -916.89 -540.93 -7.30 ~-3.76 (-1.85) (-1.27) (-1.76) -1.12 
OTHER CONTROLS 
Tester Experience 7.05 5.95 0.05 0.04 
(0.95) (0.95) (0.83) (0.80) 
Split -253.10 -252.93 -1.71 -1.37 
(1.58) (-1.83) (-1.28) (1.25) 
Frrst 50.82 127.96 0.17 1.11 
(0.52) (1.52) (0.20} (1.65) 
SELLER AND INTERACTION EFFECTS 
Minority Owner (l=Yes) 446.74 472.22 2.89 3.53 
(1.00) (1.24) (0.78) (1.18) 
Minority OwnerxBlack Tester -165.10 12.05 -0.17 0.70 
(-0.28) (-0.02) (-0.03) (0.18) 
Tester WF, Seller WF -69.39 368.58 -0.89 2.18 
(-0.15) (0.94) (-0.23) (0.70) 
Tester WF, Seller BM 76.56 -129.69 0.19 -1.22 
(0.26) (-0.51) (0.08) (-0.61) 
Tester BM, Seller WF 427.90 243.44 4.13 2.58 
(1.06) (0.71) (1.22) (0.94) 
Tester BM, Seller BM 379.60 80.02 3.41 0.92 
(0.95) (0.23) (1.02) (0.34) 
Tester BF, Seller WF 190.31 248.60 2.02 2.46 
(0.59) (0.91) (0.75) (1.13) 
Tester BF, Seller BM 464.32 673.29• 3.30 5.54• 
(1.42) (2.41) (1.21) (2.50) 
SUMMARY STATISTICS 
ADJ-R2 0.26 0.33 0.29 0.39 
SSRxlCJ3 256859 187741 17.96 11.78 
F-TESTS 
White Female Tester Effect F(3,367) 0.78 1.66 0.83 1.79 
Black Male Tester Effect F(6,367) 8.07• 14.72• 1.11• 16.64• 
Black Female Tester Effect F(6,367) 2.99• 4.12• 3.06• 4.62• 
• S~ficantly different from zero at the 5 percent level. 
• 0 er variables included in regression but not shown to save space: constant term, model 
dummies, TIME, day-of-week dummies, and week-of-month dummies. See SUf!.Ta Table I. 
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more likely to discriminate against their own employees, with 
whom they presumably have to associate quite closely over an ex-
tended period of time, than against their customers. Given that 
owners frequently hire nonwhite male salespersons, who comprised 
21.3 % of the salespeople in our sample, it seems implausible that 
these owners would need a $500 higher markup to compensate 
them for selling to nonwhite male customers. 
2. Salesperson Animus 
Salespeople are another possible source of animus. The interac-
tion effects in the regressions of Table III attempt to test whether 
the gender and race of the salesperson influenced the amount of 
discrimination our testers experienced. The coefficients were uni-
formly insignificant, casting doubt on both consequential and asso-
ciational employee animus as a source of discrimination. Black 
testers did no worse when buying from white salespersons, and 
women did not get worse deals when the salesperson was male.86 
We did find some direct evidence of animus in the form of ex-
plicitly racist or sexist statements by salespeople. However, sales-
people were more likely to use hostile language when bargaining 
with white males than with other testers.87 
3. Customer Animus 
A dealership's customers should also be considered as a poten-
tial source of associational animus against black or women consum-
ers. John Ymger, for example, concludes that in the housing 
market, discrimination against blacks is motivated by realtors' per-
ceptions that other renters or house buyers dislike having a black 
neighbor.88 Sellers' effective per period cost, cs. could be higher for 
black or female consumers if their presence in the showroom made 
it less likely that others, whites or men, would shop there. 
The evidence for associational animus on the part of customers, 
however, is weak. Concerns about the reactions of other customers 
86. The one exception was that black women did seem to get worse deals when buying 
from black salesmen. F tests for the joint significance of the tester-seller interactions were 
also uniformly insignificant, with the exception of black females in the final markup equation. 
The original study found that women and blacks received higher offers when negotiating 
against a salesperson of the same race-gender, and that testers were steered toward sales-
people of the same race and gender as themselves. Ayres, supra note 1, at 819, 840. We 
detected, however, no evidence of such steering in the current study. 
Erl. Salespeople made hostile or demeaning statements in about 4% of the white male 
tests and in just under 3% of the nonwhite male tests. 
88. Yinger, supra note 14. 
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should lead dealers to shepherd blacks and women out of the show-
room as rapidly as possible to avoid their being seen by other po-
tential customers. Yet it was white male testers, rather than blacks 
or white women, who had the shortest average negotiating sessions. 
There is, however, some evidence of neighborhood-based conse-
quential animus. Black testers buying in a predo~antly white 
neighborhood might encounter more customer-based consequential 
animus than in a black neighborhood. Under this theory, black cus-
tomers might receive lower offers in black neighborhoods because 
sellers would be less likely to reflect the consequential animus of 
their customers. Table III estimates that black testers did receive 
lower final offers when shopping in black, rather than white, neigh-
borhoods. The coefficients on these interaction variables were 
large, in the range of -$540 to -$900, but were statistically 
insignificant.89 
E. Cost-Based Statistical Discrimination 
Differences in buyers' cost of bargaining ( cb) might also induce 
seller discrimination. One group of buyers might have high bar-
gaining costs relative to another either because of their opportunity 
costs, for example lost wages are high, or because they have a 
greater dislike for the process of bargaining.9o The key question in 
the present context is whether these bargaining costs are correlated 
with race or gender. 
Figure 3 depicts our estimates of the buyers' costs of bargaining 
for each buyer type. For all discount rates, the ordering of buyers' 
transaction costs remains stable: black males have the lowest costs 
89. Neighborhoods are defined by what the City of Chicago calls "Community Areas." 
Each contains 30,000-60,000 people. "Community areas are defined by the City of Chicago 
as groups of census tracts. They were first identified in the 1930s by the Social Science Re-
search Council of the University of Chicago. They correspond roughly to infonnally recog-
nized neighborhoods such as Lakeview and Hyde Park. The boundaries have changed very 
little since their inception ..•• " CITY OF CHICAGO, CHICAGO STATISTICAL ABSTRAcr 
(1992). 
Although the signs of the coefficients are consistent with consequential animus, there are 
compelling theoretical reasons to exclude consequential animus by consumers as a cause of 
disparate treatment by dealers. Most consumers do not have infonnation about the prices 
other consumers have received, so they are not in a position to take pleasure in others' mis-
fortune, which is the definition of consequential animus. 
90. The social psychology literature has not reached a finn conclusion about whether 
there are racial or gender differences in aversion to bargaining. JEFFREY Z. RUBIN AND 
BERT R BROWN, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF BARGAINING AND NEGOTIATION 162-65, 
169-74 (1975). A recent newspaper article interviewed dealers who suggested that middle-
class black males associated the need to bargain with poverty and were thus reluctant to 
bargain. Warren Brown, Who Gets the Best Deals on Wheels? WASH. PoST, Dec.14, 1990, at 
Fl. 
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and black females have the highest. See Table II for calculations at 
a representative discount rate.· 
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FIGURE 3: ESTIMATES OF THE PER-PERIOD CosT OF 
NEGOTIATING FOR DIFFERENT TESTER RACE-GENDER TYPES (Cb) 
FOR VARYING DISCOUNT RATES (r) 
Figure 3 thus provides some evidence that the race and gender 
discrimination was caused by the sellers' perceptions of differences 
in buyers' bargaining costs. The higher offers to black female test-
ers might be partially attributable to their higher costs of bargain-
ing. White female and black male testers also had lower estimated 
bargaining costs (cb) than white male buyers which would by them-
selves have produced lower offers. But our parameter estimates tell 
us that despite their own lower bargaining costs, white females and 
black males also faced lower seller bargaining costs as well as less 
favorable distributions of reservation prices. On balance, the seller 
bargaining costs and reservation price effects dominated.91 
91. Ancillary evidence suggests that dealers may have attempted to take advantage of 
women's and blacks' greater aversion to bargaining by making it procedurally harder for 
these buyer types to purchase a car. First, black males were more often asked to sign 
purchase orders (40.2% vs. 27.6% for white males; x2c1> = 7.14) and to put down a deposit 
(37.7% vs. 25.6% for white males; x2c1> = 6.78). Black testers were also much more likely than 
white males to be "bumped" - that is, to have the manager raise a salesperson's offer (7.0% 
vs. 1.5%; x2(1) = 7.66). 
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F. Revenue-Based Statistical Discrimination 
Figure 4 estimates sellers' beliefs about tester reservation prices, 
particularly the implied highest-valuing buyer for each of the differ-
ent buyer types.92 For all discount rates, there is a stable ordering 
of reservation prices that matches the ordering of initial and final 
seller offers: sellers believe that black males are willing to pay the 
most, and white males to pay the least. 
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The plausibility of revenue-based statistical discrimination as an 
explanation for the discrimination we found is heightened by the 
fact that salespersons have their own term for a kind of statistical 
discrimination, which they call "qualifying the buyer." "Qualify-
ing" is the process of estimating how much the buyer is willing and-
or able to pay on the basis of direct observations, such as how the 
buyer is dressed and what kind of car she is currently driving, and 
answers to questions the seller asks, "How did you get to the deal-
ership?" and "Have you visited other dealerships?" Even though 
92. That is, the figure depicts implicit seller beliefs about the upper bound (h1) of buyer 
reservation prices for each buyer type. Because sellers' behavior does not depend on the 
other characteristics of the uniform distribution (such as the mean or the lower bound}, it is 
not possible to estimate these parameters using test buyers. 
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the average black person is poorer than the average white male, the 
upper tail of the valuation distribution for blacks could be higher or 
fatter because of differences in information or higher costs of 
search. 
1. Search Costs 
Sellers might perceive that race and gender are related to buy-
ers' search costs for several reasons. For example, black consumers 
might have higher search costs because they are less likely than 
whites to own a car at the time they are shopping for a new one, 
and therefore might have more difficulty travelling to multiple 
dealerships. 93 
Our data provide some evidence that sellers considered search 
costs to be differentially important for different groups of testers. 
Nonwhite male testers were more than 2.5 times as likely as white 
males to be asked how they got to the dealership, suggesting that 
dealers show particular interest in determining whether nonwhite 
males have substantial opportunities to search. In addition, testers 
who revealed that they did not own a car had to pay $127 higher 
markup while those who indicated that they had visited other deal-
erships saved $122 although these results were only significant at a 
20 percent level.94 
The evidence does not uniformly support a search cost explana-
tion, however. If sellers are sensitive to buyers' search costs in set-
ting prices, we would expect black testers to receive better deals in 
the suburbs than at urban dealerships. By travelling the substantial 
distance from the center city to the Chicago suburbs, where very 
few blacks live, blacks are in effect signalling to suburban dealers 
that they are willing and able to undertake an extensive search for a 
93. Fred Mannering & Clifford Wmston, Brand Loyalty and the Decline of the American 
Automobile Firms, BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACI1VITY- MICROECONOMICS 67 {1991). 
There is a large, uneven, and largely dated marketing literature that does seem to support the 
notion that "[v]ariation in prepurchase search behavior is related to racial differences." See, 
e.g., Carl E. Block, Prepurchase Search Behavior of Low-Income Households, 48 J. RETAIL-
ING, Spring 1972, at 3, 9. Laurence Feldman and Alvin Starr also conclude that there are 
differences in search behavior by race although they find that these diminish after controlling 
for income. Laurence Feldman & Alvin Starr, Racial Factors in Shopping Behavior, in A 
NEW MEASURE OF REsPONSIBILITY FOR MARKETING 216 (Keith Cox & Ben M. Enis eds., 
1968). For a survey of studies examining differences in car ownership rates by race that 
concludes that blacks are less likely to own a car than whites, even after controlling for in-
come, see RAYMOND A. BAUER & Scarr M. CuNN!NGHAM, STUDIES IN THE NEGRO MAR-
KET 156-78 {1970). 
94. These figures were derived by constructing dummy variables for the tests where this 
information was revealed and including them in the final profit regression in Table I. Testers 
revealed this information only when asked, however, and the dealer's decision to ask the 
question might not be exogenous to the dealer's final offer. 
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car. Yet contrary to this theory, the regression estimates that blacks 
negotiating in suburbs faced initial and final offers that were respec-
tively $64 and $264 higher than offers given to blacks at city dealer-
ships - these differences are statistically insignificant.95 Moreover, 
initial and final offers for black testers in all-white neighborhoods 
were $916 and $540 higher than in all-black neighborhoods; again, 
this result was statistically insignificant.96 The presence of black 
customers in white neighborhoods did not signal a willingness to 
search that translated into lower dealer offers.97 
2. Consumer Information 
Race and-or gender may also be correlated with buyers' infor-
mation about the car market. For example, a Consumer Federation 
of America survey found that 37% of respondents did not believe 
that the sticker price on a car was negotiable.9s More important for 
our purpose is the fact that there were wide differences in consumer 
knowledge by race and gender. Sixty-one percent of blacks sur-
veyed believed the price was not negotiable while only 31 % of 
whites believed this. Women were more likely than men to be mis-
informed about the willingness of dealers to bargain, although the 
disparities were not as great as between blacks and whites.99 · 
Sellers in our study may have been motivated in part by such 
informational disparities in quoting higher prices to blacks and 
women. Dealers were somewhat more likely to volunteer informa-
tion about the cost of the car to white males than to the other test-
ers, possibly because they believed that white males already had 
95. The t-statistics for these coefficients were .25 and 1.22 respectively. 
96. The t-statistics were only 1.85 and 1.28. 
97. Customer animus and search-cost theories of discrimination may not be independent. 
Neighborhoods with few black residents probably also have stronger animus against black 
customers, and it is precisely by venturing into such hostile neighborhoods that blacks could 
most effectively signal that they have low search costs. Thus, animus might swamp, or at least 
confound, the signalling effect and cause blacks bargaining in such neighborhoods to pay 
higher prices. 
98. CONSUMER FEDN. OF AM., U.S. CoNSUMER KNOWLEDGE: THE RESULTS OF A NA-
TIONWIDE TEST (1990); see also Ayres, supra note 1, at 856 n.115. 
99. See CoNSUMER FEDN. OF AM., supra note 98, at 8; see also Ayres, supra note 1, at 856 
n.115. Because the survey respondents were not limited to people who were actually inter-
ested in buying a car, the survey may overstate racial differences in information among the 
car buying public if nonbuying blacks are relatively less informed than nonbuying whites. 
George Moschis and Roy Moore do find "differences in consumer knowledge, skills and 
attitudes between blacks and whites" controlling actual purchase behavior. George Moschis 
& Roy Moore, Racial and Socioeconomic Influences on Adolescent Consumer Behavior, in 
PROCEEDINGS OF TiiE AMERICAN MARKETING ASSOCIATION 261 (1981). 
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such information.100 More significantly, dealers used the sticker 
price as their first offer to 29% of nonwhite males, but to only 9% 
of white male testers.101 This suggests that sellers believed white 
males were more knowledgeable than other testers about the possi-
bility of departing from sticker prices. 
In sum, this exercise of estimating the causes of discrimination 
has shown that the sellers' bargaining behavior is broadly consistent 
with revenue-based statistical inference as a partial cause of the 
sellers' discrimination: sellers' differential beliefs about the testers' 
reservation prices track sellers' initial and final offers. This exercise 
has also shown that sellers may discriminate against different buyer 
types for different reasons. Figure 3 shows that sellers' discrimina-
tion against black females may in part stem from a belief that black 
females are more averse to bargaining than white males, and Figure 
2 suggests that consequential animus may explain part of sellers' 
discrimination against black males. 
We emphasize again that these results must be i.Ilterpreted cau-
tiously. In order to identify the relationship between the sellers' 
concessions and the underlying parameters, we have had to make 
strong assumptions. Under alternative assumptions, the concession 
data are susceptible to alternative interpretations. For example, in-
stead of assuming that the discount rate is the same for each buyer 
type, we might assume a constant seller bargaining cost for the four 
kinds of testers, and allow the discount rate to vary. Part C of Table 
II shows that when we assume a constant seller bargaining cost of 
$100 per hour, the implicit discount rate for negotiations with black 
male testers is substantially lower than the discount rate for white 
males - .17 vs .. 63%.102 Even assuming a constant seller bargain-
ing cost, the model's estimates of reservation prices and buyer cost 
retain the same ordinal ranking - suggesting that our conclusions 
about statistical discrimination are robust to this alternative 
assumption. 
100. White males were given unsolicited cost information in 55% of their tests while all 
other testers were given such information in 48% of tests. The difference was not statistically 
significant at the 5 percent level, however. 
101. This difference was statistically significant (x.2(1> = 25.9). 
102. Because the discount rate can be thought of as the probability that bargaining will 
exogenously terminate, this might be interpreted to mean that black males have a considera-
bly lower probability of exogenous termination than the other tester types. Under this inter-
pretation, dealers would be willing to hold out longer for a high price with black males 
because the dealers believe there is a low chance the bargaining will be terminated. 
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CONCLUSION 
The audits analyzed in this article further demonstrate a strong 
dealer tendency to offer white male testers lower prices than black 
testers. The task of combatting this disparate treatment may be 
particularly difficult because that discrimination may have diverse 
causes. While enhanced enforcement of section 1981's103 prohibi-
tions against disparate racial treatment is a laudable goal, I con-
tinue to be pessimistic that private litigation will be sufficient to 
deter discrimination. This conclusion suggests instead that encour-
aging "no-haggle" selling might reduce dealers' discretion to 
discriminate. 
In the three years since the original discrimination study was 
published, the retail car market has seen a dramatic shift away from 
haggling.104 More than 10% of new car dealers currently sell all of 
their cars at nonnegotiable prices, and more than 70% of dealers 
sell at least one of their models without dickering.105 There has also 
been a dramatic growth in the use of third-party buying services 
that bargain on behalf of individual consumers - with more than 
one-quarter of dealerships selling cars through such services.106 
Many newspaper articles have linked this shift away from hag-
gling to a growing frustration of women and minorities \vith the 
process and results of negotiation.10? Indeed, the original study 
103. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 {1988), amended by 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (Supp. V 1993). 
104. Hal Porter, One Price Fits All; No-Haggle Car Deals Are Finding a Niche, THE REC-
ORD, June 17, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, NJREC File. 
105. See, e.g., James Bennet, Buying Without Haggling As Cars Get Fixed Prices, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 1, 1994, at Al. Saturn has been successful in prohibiting its dealers from hag-
gling over the sticker price of its cars. In many cities, so called "no dicker" or "one price" 
dealerships have also independently decided to forego the potential profits of negotiation. 
The practice is especially prevalent among high-volume sellers: "Fifteen percent. of high-
volume operators today have at least a single one price dealership." Mary Connelly, 'One-
price' growth tapers off, AUTOMOTIVE NEws, Dec. 27, 1993, at 1 (citing a December 1993 J.D. 
Powers and Associates study). 
106. For example, a nonprofit corporation, Car Bargains {for a fee of $135) solicits offers 
from at least five dealers in the customer's area. Your Money: Services Can Save Thousands 
with No-Haggle Car Buying, (CNN television broadcast, July 23, 1994), available in LEXIS; 
Nexis Library, SCRIPT File. 
107. Ann Arnott, The Wise Buyer's Car Guide, ESSENCE, Nov. 1993, at 119, 120 ("If 
you're a sister who hates to bargain, try shopping for a car at a 'one-price' or 'no-haggle' 
dealership."); Tun Martin, Thousands Due For Saturn Homecoming, GANNETI NEWS SER· 
VICE, June 23, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, GNS File ("[Saturn's] low-pressure 
approach appeals especially to women .••. "); John M. McGuire, Women Fuel Demand For 
Sport Utility Vehicles, ST. Lams Posr-DISPATCH, May 30, 1993, available in LEXIS, News 
Library, SLPD Ftle {"That's why Saturn has the one-price deal. Women don't like the car-lot 
haggle."); Bob Storck, American Classics: Trucks With an Attitude, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 24, 
1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, WTIMES Ftle ("[T]he dealership experience is 
often demeaning to women. It [is] suggested the one-price, no haggle concept pioneered by 
Saturn and Ford Escort should have appeal."); Car Buying Could Be Fairer Without the Hag-
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may have played a small role in heightening consumer awareness, 
particularly about the extent of price discrimination: the article was 
widely reported in the news media,108 and several writers have re-
ferred to its finding as an explicit reason why women or minorities 
might want to buy from no-haggle dealerships or through third-
party buying services.109 Many dealers themselves have responded 
by claiming that they, unlike others in the industry, treat women 
fairly.110 A few dealers' advertisements have even attempted to 
distinguish explicitly their practices from the conduct uncovered in 
the original study.111 
The experience of the last three years suggests that the institu-
tion of haggling may not be immutably entrenched. Minor legal 
changes that improve consumer information may be sufficient to 
move the market. In particular, the Federal Trade Commission 
could more clearly define nonfraudulent uses of the "dealer in-
voice" amount, so that no-haggle dealerships could speak more 
credibly about their gross profit.112 Or, as argued in the original 
article: 
gling Hassle, BUFF. NEWS, Feb. 13, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, BUFNEW File 
("No-haggle pricing could prove a particular hit with the greater number of women who buy 
cars these days, since so many feel ill at ease in the auto world."). 
108. Brown, supra note 90, at Fl; Dennis Cauchon, Undercover tests identify bias, USA 
TODAY, Sept. 26, 1991, available in LEXIS, News Library, USATDY File; Ellen Goodman, 
Driving home a point about not being a victim, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 30, 1990, at § 5, 1; Delores 
Kong, Study Offers Proof of Car-Sales Bias, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 14, 1993, at 36; Joann 
Muller, Study finds race bias in car prices, DET. FREE PREss, Dec. 14, 1990, at lA; William E. 
Schmidt, White Men Get Better Deals on Cars, Study Finds, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.13, 1990, at A6; 
Blacks, Women Charged More for Cars, Study Says, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 14, 1990, at D4. 
In addition to newspapers, the study was also widely discussed on television and radio 
shows including the ABC Evening News, the CBS Morning Show, CNN, Oprah, three Prime-
Ttme Live segments, and NPR's All Things Considered. 
109. See, e.g., Amott, supra note 107, at 120; Will Astor, No-dicker deals, ROCHESTER 
Bus. J., Oct. 1, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, ROCH Ftle; Shelly Donald Collidge, 
Purchasing a Car? Using a Buying Service Could Save Big Bucks, CmuSTIAN Sa. MONITOR, 
Sept. 8, 1994, at 8 ("A 1991 Harvard Law Review study found women and minorities pay 
prices that give a dealer up to 242 percent more profit than the dealer would get on sales to 
white males. Because a club buyer negotiates, the dealer doesn't know who the customer 
is."); Kim Ode, Women pay price for capitalism, STAR TRIB. (MlNNEAPous ), May 25, 1993, at 
lE. 
110. See, e.g., Advertisement for Silver Lake Dodge & Leasing, BOSTON WOMAN, Winter 
1990, at 7a ("Where you don't have to bring a man along to be treated like a customer."). 
But a PrimeTime Live audit of one of Marge Schotz's dealerships in Cincinnati uncovered 
discrimination against a female tester - even though Schatz explicitly advertises that she 
treats women fairly. l'ruMETlME LIVE (May 24, 1993). 
111. See, e.g., Mass Mailing From Gerald Lincoln-Mercury, Skokie, IL (Nov. 8, 1993) 
("[A] recent Harvard University research project document[s that] ..• [s]ome groups paid 
over three times the amount of dealer mark-up than others were able to negotiate .... We 
believe that no one should have to pay more because of race, gender or negotiation skills."). 
112. The regulation defining the "dealer invoice" amount should exclude from the 
"dealer cost" or "dealer invoice" any rebates or kickbacks from the manufacturer to the 
dealer. See Ayres & Miller, supra note 47, at 1062. 
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Regulators might reduce the number of sales with disparately high 
markups by mandating various types of disclosure from dealers to 
consumers. Dealerships, for example, might be required to reveal the 
average price for which each make of car is sold. Knowing that the 
dealership is attempting to charge $3000 more than the average price 
would allow high-markup consumers to protect themselves.113 
Armed with this information, consumers could protect themselves 
by patronizing no-haggle dealerships. This type of mandated dis-
closure would reduce the dealers' opportunity to extract a large 
profit from a small group of consumers and thus eliminate the pri-
mary reasons that dealers like to haggle. 
The time is particularly ripe to consider such reform because the 
industry may be on the verge of tipping almost completely to "no-
haggle" sales - needing only a slight nudge from enlightened regu-
lation.114 The current equilibrium with 10% of dealers using no-
haggle approaches may not be stable. The presence of no-haggle 
dealers has provoked an "emotional response" from the other deal-
ers,115 and the growth rate of no-haggle sales has begun to taper.116 
Nudging the retail market toward no-haggle selling would ad-
vance both the equity and efficiency of car sales.117 The dealers' 
attempts to extract high profits from a small group of consumers 
creates large costs for both dealers and consumers. No-haggle sales 
require fewer sales people and fewer dealerships. There are good 
reasons for Chicago to have 94 movie theaters, but Chicago does 
not need 523 car dealerships.118 The overhead at many of these 
dealerships and the salaries of many salespeople are paid for by a 
113. Ayres, supra note 1, at 869. Alternatively, regulators might force dealers to directly 
reveal the size of their markup. See Ayres & Miller, supra note 47, at 1063-64. 
114. Somewhat speculatively, I predict that if "no-haggle" sales reach 40% of a geo-
graphic market that substantially all of the dealers in that market would soon be forced to 
shift away from dickering on the new car prices. At some critical market share, the multiple 
no-haggle dealerships will start competing for consumers on the basis of the publicly admit-
ted prices. It will be increasingly difficult for haggle dealerships to sell at prices above the no-
haggle prices. Most current no-haggle dealerships do not have enough no-haggle competi-
tion to drift them to publicly compete on no-haggle prices. 
115. Bennet, supra note 105; see also Tim Martin, No-Dicker Sticker Has Mixed Success, 
NASHVILLE TENNESSEAN, Apr. 12, 1994, at D6 (" 'The competition between one-price and 
traditional dealers has changed from a battle to an all-out war.'" (quoting Mike Rikess, a 
consultant for one-price dealerships)). 
116. Connelly, supra note 105. 
117. In small towns, a shift to fixed-price competition might facilitate anticompetitive 
collusion because competitors could more easily learn when other dealers were chiseling on 
the collusive price. But a general move away from no-haggle bargaining might increase con-
sumer choice in all but the most isolated towns. No-haggle sales would make it much easier 
to purchase a car over the phone or through the mail - so that small town residents could 
easily compare their local prices to prices quoted by big-city dealers. 
118. These figures are taken from the Chicago area YELLOW PAOES. 
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few consumers who pay disproportionately high markups. This is 
not only inefficient, but also unfair. 
To be sure, shifting to no-haggle sales might not be a panacea,119 
but more than efficiency is at stake. This article has further sub-
stantiated the possibility of systematic racial and gender discrimina-
tion in new car sales. Our tentative estimation of the bargaining 
model suggests that this discrimination has diverse causes. Instead 
of using traditional civil rights approaches to eliminate race and 
gender disparities within a larger system of haggling, it may be 
more appropriate to target haggling itself and the inequitable price 
dispersion that haggling induces. 
119. Dealerships, for example, could still extract disproportionate profits on trade-ins, 
financing, and otber ancillary terms of trade. 
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APPENDIX 
Cramton shows that the seller's equilibrium strategy can be 
characterized by a concession function indicating the offers (p) that 
it would be willing to make (or counteroffers it would be willing to 
accept) for any given delay (8): 
p(!:!,.) = e-rA(Xb1 + ~s) - ~s, (1) 
where b1 is the buyer type that is indifferent about accepting the 
seller's initial offer, and x equals the seller's share of the gains from 
trading with a buyer of type b1:120 
1 (cb - Cs) 
x = 2 + 2rb1 · (2) 
b1 is determined by the :first-order condition that maximizes the 
seller's expected payoff. Assuming that buyers' reservation prices 
follow a uniform distribution on the interval [O,h ], this first order 
condition is: 
3(2cb)lf2(ci}3 - Cs) 
(2r)3a(xb1 + csfr)m -. r (3) 
The buyers' participation constraint completes the model. Buy-
ers whose reservation price is below some critical value, b p, cannot 
profitably signal their type because the transaction costs of delay 
produce negative buyer payoffs. Anticipating that any gains from 
trade will more than be consumed in bargaining, these low-valuing 
buyers will refuse to participate in the game. Sellers can calculate 
the maximum delay, l:!..p (and associated bp), after which a rational 
buyer would be unwilling to bargain: 
ln[2cb!(rb1 + C)] 
l:!..p=- ' 2r 
(4) 
where C =Cs+ cb. Buyer offers made after l:!..pthus represent out-of-
equilibrium behavior (which occurred because our testers followed 
a bargaining script and were not subject to the same participation 
constraint). We assume that any seller receiving an offer after a 
delay greater than l:!..p would believe with probability one that the 
120. See Cramton, supra note 9. The term "gains from trade" refers to the amount by 
which the buyer's value exceeds the seller's. The division of gains under symmetric informa-
tion was first derived by Rubinstein and is often referred to as the buyer's and seller's Rubin-
stein share. Ariel Rubinstein, Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model, 50 ECONOMETRICA 
97 (1982). 
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buyer's reservation price is b F· Sellers should therefore refuse to 
make further concessions once the delay reaches l:!.F. The buyers' 
participation constraint can thus help explain the fact that sellers at 
times refused to make further concessions when negotiating with 
our testers. 
Combining equations (2) and (3) with the facts that the initial 
price P1 = p(l:!.=0) = xb1 and the final price PF= p(l:!.=1:!.F), it is possible 
to solve for cS1 cb, and h as functions of the observable variables and 
r (as shown in equations (1)-(3), supra at note 73). 
Consequential Animus 
If a seller's payoff increased by a factor a. > 1 for each additional 
dollar secured in negotiations with a disfavored consumer group, 
then x can be interpreted as a measure of consequential animus. If 
x = 2 the seller gains twice the utility from extracting profits from a 
disfavored buyer. Increases in x cause the seller to bargain as if its 
effective per period cost of bargaining was lower so that c 's = csla.. 
Resolving for the Rubinstein shares, the expression for x in equa-
tion (2) would become: 
x' = (112) + (cb - c's)/2rb1. 
An increase in consequential animus (in other words, a rise in 
a.) would thus be reflected in a lower e's and a higher seller share of 
the gains from trade. 
